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Five years aft,er tlre fall of the Berlin Wall, the major
institutional reconstruction measures 
- 
centering on
the transition from the centrally planned to the social
market economy 
- 
have been accomplished. Yet even
now it is still diffic'ult to determine the risks and the
potential ofthe new economic system in East Germany.
What is clear, however, is that 
- 
to pick up on a wish
expressed by Willy Brandt that has since become fa-
mous 
- 
not all that'belongs together" in the economic
life of the new kind,er has yet ugrown together'.
The enterprise-size structure of the East German
industrial sectorhas come into line with that prevniling
in Weet Germany. Ttris convergence has resulted from
two processes: the deconcentration and privatisation of
formerly state-owned enterprises (top-down transfor-
mation) and the setting-up of new small and medium-
sized firms (bottom-up transformation). Sample sur-
veys indicate that at least 807o ofthe newly constituted
firms are genuine new fims (including one-person
companies) rather than the product of formerly state-
owned production units. At the some time, the failure
rate among new businesses is high, so that major utur-
bulence', i.e. job losses, is to be expected here in the
csming years. Defioiencies in the areas of work organi-
sation and management, and the lack of equity capital
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Instruments
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Information
are all problemn to which government support progremrnss
are attempting to offer a solution. The risk of small-busi-
ness failure in the new federal states must be seen in the
light of the fact that just 5.|Vo of theBast Geman working
population consisLs of "entrepreneurs', whereas the self-
employed make up about 107o ofthe West German working
population. It therefore seems that there is still a consider-
able potential for new business start-ups in the new
kind,er.
In the seming years the East German economy will
remain heavily dependent on support formWest Germany.
Even under optimistic agsumptions, the prognoses and
scenarios developed so far offerno grounds for expectations
of a rapid rise in East Geman per-capita income to West
German rates. Outward migration, together with the de-
cline in the birth rate and in female participation rates, may
well mean, however, that registered unemployment in the
two halves of Germany will converge more rapidly than
production levels.
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National accounts of the German Economic Research Institute (DIW),Octaber 1994 (rows L.-3,4,5.,6.-6.7); Official Reports and Press
Releasesofthe Federal Employment Service (rows 7.1-?.3,8.2, 10.-10.5);Institute forEmployment Research(IAB),IAB-Kurzberithteatd
IAB-Werkstattberichte (rows 4., 4.1,5.2,8.1); Infratest Social Research, labour market monitor for the new Federal states, MunicV
Nuremberg 1991-93 (rows 4.2, 5.1); monthly information sheet of the Tleuhandanstalt (tow 5.2); calculations by the editors.
Comments:
In general, stock data in the table correspond with figures drawn up at the end ofthe given half-year periods (except: rows 4.2,5.1: data
forMay or November; rows 5., 6.1-6.7: averages of the 2nd and 4th quarters respectively; row 5.2: 1991 1 July and 1 January aft,er the end
ofthe haU-years).
Row 5.2: initial figure mid 1990 ca. 4 million; rcw 7.4: number of short-time workers multiplied by the average smount of working time
lost; row 8.1: until mid 1992 estimated; rows 9.1, 11.1: potential labour force defined as the sum ofresident wage and salary earaers, self-
employed, unemployed and the participants in further training and early retirement; rows 10.3-10.5: from 1994 onwards the basis of the
unemplo5rment rate has been changed (dependent civilian working population in June 1993; earlier basis dated from the end of 1989, then
from November 1990 and then from June 1992).
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The Transformation of East Germany's Corporate
Structure
Ihe transformation under way in the East German economy since
1990 has been coupled with a dramatic change in corporate struc-
tures. llrhereas in the GDR production was eonfined to a relatively
small number of large-scale enterprises, the number of companigg
has since multiplied. A previously glmesl non-existent small and
medium-sized sector developed extremely rapidly, with the result
that the enteqprise-size structure in East German industry now
conforms to that of western Gemany. Ihe a{iustment is the result
of two processes: on the one hand, a "top-down'transformation took
place as fomerly state-owned enterprises were privatised. On the
other hand, many jobs were created when new businesses were set
up, constituting a "bottom-up'transfom.ation. However, so far the
'hew-businessboom'inthe new federal states has been confrned to
branches which can hardly be considered a basis for a lasting and
self-sustaining upswing. Moreover, the large number of new enter-
prises is counterbalanced by a growing number of closures arnong
new compa.ies, although to a large extent this can be seen as
characteristic for'tnonnal" selection processes. Current trends
suggest that it will probably take quite some time before reasonably
stable sectoral snd corporate structures have developed inthe new
federal states.
Corporate structure: initial
situation and developments
since 1989
The economy of the GDR was char-
acterised by a dominance of very
large production units. As a rule,
each unit was responsible for sev-
eral manufacturing stages: often
individual state-owned enterprises
or industrial combines shaped the
economic development of entire re-
gions (cf. East Germany no. 3/4,pp.
3-6). The high degree ofvertical in-
tegration had the advantage that
enterprises were relatively inde-
pendent with respect to suppliers
and potential supply shortages; the
size ofthe units was a disadvantage
in that it was accompanied by corre-
spondingly bureaucratic internal
procedures, inefficiency, and insuf-
ficient flexibility. Small and me-
dium-sized companies, by contrast,
played only a marginal role 
- 
in
comparison to the West German
economy, orto otherdeveloped mar-
ket economies (cf. Figure 1). The
priority employment sectors of the
GDR economy were those branches
(e. g. agriculture, enerry, and the
basic goods industry) in which many
jobs had been lost during the pre-
ceding decades in the old federal
states. Producer-oriented services
were largely integrated within
manufacturing plants; consumer-
oriented economic branches were of
only minor significance.
The effect of the transformation
process from 1990 onwards was that
as early as the autumn of 1992, i. e.
only two years after German unifi-
cation, one could no longer discern
any significant difference between
the new and the old federal states
with regard to enterprise-size struc-
tures in the manufacturing sector
(cf. Figure 1). Indeed there was a
higher share of employees in small
companies than in the West in many
branches of the East German
economy. Empirical studies show
that during this period the East
German economy had largely come
into line with West German pat-
terns with respect to the degree of
vertical integration. At the same
time, however, the share of manu-
facturing employment in East Ger-
many's total employed labour force
fell from more than one third to
around 2OVo; tlis is much lower
than the figure for West Germany,
which is approx. 307o.
The dramatic change in the corpo-
rate structure of the new federal
states is the result of two different
processes. Firstly, many of the for-
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merly state-owned, large-scale com-
panies were split up, privatised, re-
turned to their previous owners,
transferred to municipal owner-
ship, or were closed down ("top-
down" transformation); these proc-
esses were usually accompanied by
huge manpower cuts. Secondly, nu-
merous new businesses were set up,
generating new jobs 
- 
at the very
least for those who formed the com-
panies ("bottom-up" transforma-
tion).
Top-down transformation:
privatisation by the Tleuhand.-
anctalt
Tlhe Treuhandanstalt's task was to
rapidly convert the companies un-
der its charge into competitive pri-
vate enterprises (cf. East Germany
no. 11, pp. 3-6). Before the Treu-
handanstalt began operations in
October 1990, a so-called "small-
scale privatisation" had already
commenced under the last govern-
ment of the GDR at the start of the
sameyear; some 25,000 properties-
small hotels, restaurants, cinemas,
retail outlets 
- 
were sold to private
buyers under this programme.
When the Tleuhandanstalt was
set up it took over around 8,500
state-owned enterprises. This made
it the largest holding company in
the world and manager of a vast
part of the former GDR economy.
Around 4.1 million people 
- 
then
aboutLS%o of all workers in the new
federal states 
- 
were employed in
Tleuhandanstalt companies. As a
result, the policies pursued by the
Treuhandanstalt had. a consider-
able effect on the course of struc-
tural change, especially in the first
phase of the transformation proc-
ess. First ofall, corporate units were
deconcentrated horizontally, verti-
cally, and spatially, raising the
stock of Treuhand companies to
around 12,000 individual units (cf.
East Germany no. 1L, p. 4). By 1
September 1 994, 8,27 9 ofthese com-
panies had been privatised, 1,570
properties had been returned to
their previous owners (repri-
vatisation), and 264 enterprises
transferred to municipal owner-
ship. The majority of the enter-
prises privatised (approx. 85Vo)
were taken over by West German
firms; almost ten percent were sold
3
Figure 1:
Employees i1 rrrining and manufacturing industry in East* and
West Gemany by ente4rrise-size category (1988)
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to foreign buyers; less than 67o
passed into East German owner-
ship 
- 
mostly in the form of manage-
ment buy-outs. Liquidation pro-
ceedings were started in 3,652 en-
terprises, though only 131 ofthese
have been concluded to date.
On L September 1994, the stockof
Tleuhandanstalt comparties still on
offer consisted of three large-scale
corporations ( De utsche W aggonb au
Ltd. 
- 
comprising 10 individual
companies, Mansfelder Kupfer und
Messing, atd.EKO Slohl 
- 
compris-
ing 5 individual companies), 87 indi-
vidual companies grouped together
in five management parbnerships
(cf. East Germany no. 2, p. 7), and
another 44 individual companies.
Together these enterprises still pro-
vide employment for approx. M,O0O
persons.
It proved relatively easy to priva-
tise enterprises which primarily
operated on regional markets and
which required little in the way of
modernisation; this applied to many
companies in the energy, construc-
tion, and consumer-oriented service
sectors. Enterprises from other sec-
tors proved more difficult to priva-
tise, however, especially those in
agriculture and forestry, mining,
and the textile and clothing indus-
tries, i. e. branches which have been
marked by huge job losses during
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the last few decades in many west-
ern industrial countries. Whether
these enterprises will ultimately be
closed down, or will survive in the
medium or long term with the help
of subsidies depends to a large ex-
tent on the outcome of efforts to
preserve regional "industrial cores'
(cf. East Germany no. 11, pp. 7-9).
T)he Treuhandarustalt will con-
clude operations at the end of 1994.
There will then still be some
930,000 persons employed in ex-
Treuhand enterprises 
- 
approx.
23Vo of the initial number of
Treuhand employees and lSVo of all
persons currently in emplo5rment in
the new federal states; the number
of employees in Treuhand enter-
prises still for sale will amount to
Iess than L%o of the two variables.
"Bottom-up' transformation:
new businesses and closures
The number of new businesses set
up and those closed down in eastern
Germany can be estimated on the
basis of business registrations and
deregistrations as recorded by local
authorities. Overall, almost 1. 1 mil-
lion businesses were registered be-
tween 1990 and mid-1994. Interpre-
tations of this figure must take into
account that, firstly, not every regis-
tration means that a new business
is actually set up, and secondly, ag-
ricultural companies and the so-
called "liberal professions" (e. g.
doctors and lawyers) are not in-
cluded in the statistics. According to
estimates by the Institut fi)r Mittel-
standsforschu4g (Institute for Re-
search on Small and Medium-Sized
Businesses) in Bonn, probably less
than half(approx. 437o) of allregls-
trations are followed by actual for-
mation of a company which operates
actively in the market; it would fol-
Iow from this estimation that up to
mid-1994 slightly more than
470,000 new enterprises were set up
in the new federal states. This fig-
ure would have to be supplemented
by an unknown number ofnew agri-
cultural companies and profession-
als. A large number of the busi-
nesses registered in eastern Ger-
many, i. e. a good 467o, belonged to
the trade and catering sectors, only
4,6/o w er e industrial fi rm s, arrd, t LVo
were new craft businesses; these
proportions remained relatively
constant during this period. One
can assume that many of these new
businesses generated only "self-em-
plo5nnent" 
- 
just one job for the en-
trepreneur him/trerself, or possibly
further work for family members.
Up to mid-1994 428,000 business
registrations were cancelled in the
new federal states, although, once
again, not every cancellation indi-
cates the closwe of an enterprise
which was active in the market: the
figures also include many cases in
which the intention to set up a com-
pany was not actually realised. Ag-
ricultural companies which closed
down and a proportion ofthe profes-
sionals who went out ofbusiness are
not accounted for. According to the
estimates made by the Institute for
Research on Small and Medium-
Sized Businesses, the number of
"real" closures between 1990 and
mid-1994 was probably something
in excess of87,000. Again, the trade
and catering sectors 
- 
wo:und SOVo
of all cases 
- 
are particularly well-
represented in the records for regis-
tration cancellations; industry ac-
counts for only L.7 Vo, and. Handwerk(craft, businesses) for Ll.2Vo. The
conspicuous surplus of registra-
tions over deregistrations in the in-
dustrial sector suggests that a
relatively large share ofthese regis-
trations can be rated as "real" busi-
ness set-ups, and that a consider-
able proportion of these enterprises
suryives for at least some time in the
market.
The net number of enterprises
entering the market 
- 
calculated as
the difference between registra-
tions and deregistrations 
- 
reached
its peak as early as 1990 (cf. Figure
2). It has fallen almost continuously
since then, on the one hand because
the number of registrations (new
businesses) has declined, and on the
other because the number of cancel-
lations (closures) has risen signifi-
cantly. However, the increase in
cancellations must be seen in con-
text: firstly, the number of existing
enterprises increased steadily from
1990 onwards, so that for a given
probability offailure an increase in
the number of closures is to be ex-
pected; secondly, it is well known
that new enterprises face a particu-
larly high risk of insolvency, i. e. a
high number of new businesses will
be accompanied by a high n ,mber of
closures. In view of the competitive
disadvantages facing the economy
in East Germany, given its location,
and the fact that many entrepre-
neurs frequently lack business
know-how, it is not surprising that
the risk ofinsolvency is particularly
high in the new federal states. It will
undoubtedly take quite a few years
before the upheaval in East German
enterprises has settled down to a
"normal" level and corporate struc-
tures have achieved a stability com-
parable to conditions in western
Germany.
Despite the "new-business boom"
which has taken place during the
last few years, the proportion ofthe
working population in the new fed-
eral states engaged in entrepre-
neurial activities is still relatively
small. If one divides the number of
private enterprises in East Ger-
many by the working population(employed and unemployed), the
result is a self-employed rate of
r0sus
approx. 5.5Vo; the current percent-
age in West Gerrnany is around
107o. This is an indication thatthere
is still considerable potential for
new business set-ups in the new
federal states.
It is estimated that there were
approx. 460,000 private enter-
prises (including agriculture and
the liberal professions) in the new
federal states in mid-1993. Since
only around 10,000 private enter-
prises emerged from the stock of
companies held by the Treuhand-
anstalt, and around 25,000 compa-
nies were converted by way of the
"small-scale privatisation", it fol-
lows that it was the bottom-up
transformation 
- 
and not the poli-
cies of the Treuhandanstalt 
- 
that
spawned the large majority of the
companies and enterprises cur-
rently in existence. Various studies
based on sample surveys of new
East German enterprises verift
that at least 807o of these busi-
nesses are brand new establish-
ments which are the product nei-
ther of a privatisation nor the
deconcentration of former state-
owned enterprises. While a larger
number ofjobs were preserved by
top-down transformation in
terms of the total number em-
ployed 
- 
employees in Treuhand
and. ex-Treuhand companies still
only account for approx. 2O7o of all
the jobs in the East German pri-
vate sector.
The most striking feature of the
sectoral structure ofthe new enter-
prises in East Germany is that the
share of industrial enterprises and
industrial employees is compara-
tively small. Sectors which prima-
rily cater for local demand (e. g. re-
tailing, catering, and, Handwerk),
are already relatively well devel-
oped, while enterprises selling
goods on supra-regional markets
still are largely the exception.
Problems facing East German
enterlprises
East Geman enterprises are con-
fronted with a range of specific dif-
ficulties. Infrastructural bottle-
necks (in the areas of transporta-
tion and telecommunications, for
instance) still present problems, as
do ,nresolved disputes over prop-
erty ownership and the limited
functional capacity of the civil serv-
ice. Not only new businesses, but
also enterprises which were priva-
5
Figure 2:
Businees registrations and deregistrations in the new Ld,nd.er lllquarter of 1990 to II quarter of 1994
in thousands
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tised must invest considerable ef-
fort in the development of business
contacts, since the "old" networks
of contacts and suppliers within the
former GDR and the CMEA have
mostly broken down. The major up-
heaval in existing enterprise struc-
tures makes it extremely difficult
to establish stable business rela-
tionships.
A range of internal deficits can
be observed in many East German
enterprises; these manifest them-
selves in lower labour efficiency
compared to West Germany. In ad-
dition to technically antiquated
equipment, inadequacies in the ar-
eas of work organisation, manage-
ment, and plant utilisation are par-
ticularly relevant in this respect.
Thus average Iabour efficiency in
East German industrial plants in
1992 was oily 45Vo of the figure for
West Germany, while wages had
already increased to over 6OVo of
West German rates in the same Pe-
riod. This resulted in signifrcantly
higher unit labour costs in East
German companies, which is one
important reason behind their lack
of competitiveness compared with
their West German and interna-
tional rivals.
In addition to these difficulties,
which affect more or less all enter-
prises located in the new federal
states, businesses which were set
up by former citizens of the GDR
face a furbher severe problem: they
often have only very little equitY
capital at their disposal 
- 
probably
a consequence ofthe lack ofincen-
tives and opportunities in the
former GDR to accumulate wealth.
This lack of equity capital in turn
sets tight restrictions on the acqui-
sition ofloan capital.
Fromotion schemes for East
German enterprises
In order to combat the above diffi-
culties at least to some extent, the
development of the East German
economy is supported by a variety
of government promotion schemes.
The most important instruments
are capital subsidies for invest-
ments, such as investment premi-
ums and investment grants, fol-
lowed by low-interest loans and
special depreciation allowances'
The equity-capital aid scheme spe-
cifically seeks to alleviate ofthe eq-
uity capital deficiency prevailing in
East German enterprises. Low-in-
terest loans to East German enter-
prises with agrace period ofseveral
years for repayment constitute the
main element of this promotion
scheme. Unlike normal loans, these
loans must not be serviced from the
bankruptcy estate in cases ofinsol-
vency; i. e. they increase the guar-
antee capital and so raise the cre-
dit-worthiness of the enterprises in
question. Only recently the princi-
ple of earmarking of funds was
dropped for promotion under the
equity-capital aid scheme; the
funds may now be used not only for
real capital investments, but also
for other purposes 
- 
e. g. product
innovation or the development of
marketing strategies.
Other promotion schemes for
East German enterprises directlY
con-front common problems such as
difficulty in opening up new mar-
kets or insufficient business know-
how. These include subsidies for
general management consultancy
for small and medium-sized busi-
nesses, sales promotion schemes
(e. g. participation in trade fairs,
export credit insurance), and
schemes promoting further voca-
tional training 
- 
especially busi-
ness training. Measures of this
kind are of enormous significance
in vitalising and supporting viable
enterprises which both safeguard
and create jobs, since they target
the central problem facing most
East German enterprises, namely
to develop and supply products
which can compete on West Ger-
man and international markets.
Despite massive government aid,
many privatised East German en-
terprises are in acute danger of
bankruptcy, and 
- 
since they have
not yet fully coped with the restruc-
turing process 
- 
they are still de-
pendent on the receipt ofsuch sup-
port. In this sense especially, the
Federal Government's recent deci-
sion to provide DM 500 million for
low-interest consolidation loans to
privatised East German enter-
prises in acute need of financing
can be seen as "survival aid" for ex-
Treuhand enterprises. However,
this scheme entails the danger that
its effects are largely structurally
conservative.
Rcsults nnd conclusions
The transformation of the stock of
East German enterprises has been
extraordinarily rapid since the fall
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of the Berlin \trall. Many more jobs
have been created due to new busi-
ness set-ups than have been Pre-
served in former state-owned en-
terprises following privatisation.
Although the policy of rapid priva-
tisation by the Tleuhandanstalt
led to substantial employment
losses, this had the effect ofliberat-
ing resources which were then
available for private business
start-ups. Despite the new-busi-
ness boom in the new federal
states, however, the proportion of
the working population in self-em-
ployment is still only around half
the West German level.
Up to now, the new businesses
set up in East Germany have
mainly been confined to economic
sectors which primarily service lo-
cal and regional demand (e. g. con-
sumer-oriented services, Hand-
werk). However, in view of the first
signs ofsaturation trends and rela-
tively low domestic demand, no sig-
nificant further potential for ex-
pansion is expected in these sec-
tors. New companies in industrial
sectors with a promising future and
in service sectors oriented towards
national and international markets
are still the exception.
The rising number of closures in
East Germany should not be cause
for too much concern, since it is
quite normal in a market-economy
system for many new enterprises to
fail during the first few years. In
view of the low average 'age' of en-
terprises in East Germany, and the
lack of know-how on the part of
many entrepreneurs, one can ex-
pect considerable further upheaval
in corporate structures in the com-
ing years too.
Economic policy-makers should
not fall prey to the temptation to
use subsidies to sustain either new
businesses which have failed or
unviable Treuhand enterprises;
rather they should start with the
causes ofthe problems and strive to
improve the skills of (potential) en-
trepreneurs, especially in the area
of business know-how. Measures
which improve access to equity
capital for East German entrepre-
neurs are certainly benefrcial too.
Despite the efforts which are being
invested both on the part of East
German enterprises and the eco-
nomic policy actors, it will probably
take quite some time before a sus-
tainable economic structure has
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been established in the new federal
states. This applies in particular to
the core of the economy, namely
enterprises which operate on na-
tional and international markets.
Michael Fritsch
ClaudiaWerker
Michael Frihsch is professor of economic
policy in the Faculty ofEconomic Sciences at
the Technical University Bergekaflgmig
Freiberg(Saxony); Claudia Werker is a mem-
ber of the research staffin the same depart-
ment.
Bibliography
H. Brezinski and M. Fritsch (eds.): The Eco-
nomic lrnpact of New Firtns in Post-Socinlist
Countri.es: Bottom-Up Tlansformation in
Eostern Europe." Aldershot: Edward Elgar
Publishers (in print)
W. Fischer, H. Hax and H. K. Schneider (eds.)
(1993): Treuhandonstalt 
- 
Dos Unm\gliche
wagen. Betlin: Akademie Verlag
M. Fritsch and J. Mallok (1994): "Die Ar-
beitsproduktivitiit des industriellen Mittel-
standes in Ostdeutschland 
- 
Stand und Ent-
wicklungsperspektiven." ln: Mitteilungen
aus d.er Arbeitsmnrkt- und Berufsforschung,
27. Jg., pp. 53-59
TRTHNS
Long-term Socio-economic Prognoses for the New
l:dnder
Various prog[oses end scenarios, together with the erperience of
regional a{iustnent processes in other countries, suggest direc-
tions in which the East Geman economy might develop in the next
10 to 16 years and at what speed. Long-term developments will
depend on domestic demand and the speed at which competitive
export firms can be created. I{owever, even under the most optimis-
tic assumptions a rapid convergence between East and West Ger-
man per-capita income is not to be e:rpected. Outward migration,
together with the decline in the birth rate and in female participa-
tionrates, may well msan, however, that registered unemplo5rment
in the two halves of Germany wiII converge more rapidly than
production levels.
In view of the current rapid growth
of East German GDP and particu-
larly of fixed capital formation and
industrial output, many observers
are now hoping, after the initial
euphoria and subsequent disap-
pointment, for a rapid expansion of
East German economic activity
rates to West German levels. At the
same time, there is still consider-
able uncertainty surrounding the
direction in which, and the speed
with which the East German
economy can be expected to develop.
Many commentators have esti-
mated that it will take a generation
to transform a formerly centrally
planned economy into a market
economy. Meanwhile a number of
Iong-term socio-economic prognoses
have been published for the new
federal states. They vary consider-
ably, however, both in terms oftheir
methodology and the results ob-
tained. This article presents the
prognoses made by the German In-
stitute for Economic Research(D[W) to the year 2000, the Basle
Prognos AG to the year ZOLO, a
number of scenarios developed by
the Institute for Economic Research
in Halle (IWH), and a demographic
prognosis by the Humboldt Univer-
sity in Berlin (cf. the bibliography).
This summa4r of the various prog-
noses focuses on the results perti-
nent to labour market develop-
ments in East Germany.
DIW: Integration or stagnation
to the year 2fi)0?
The authors of the D[W study
(Giirzig/Gornig/Schulz) have drawn
up two separate scenarios for the
German economy as a whole to the
year 2000, with two corresponding
prognoses for East Germany. The
optimistic integration scenario as-
sumes that the process of world
trade liberalisation continues, and
that the economies of eastern Eu-
rope stabilise and become increas-
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ingly integrated into the European
economy as a whole; the stagnation
scenario, on the other hand, postu-
Iates obstacles to world trade and
severe restructuring problems in
easterzr Europe. On these assump-
tions, different growth rates are
derived for the German economy
over the period 1992 to 2000: an-
nual GNP growth of 2.6Vo for Ger-
many as a whole in the first sce-
nario as against jtrst l.4%o in the
second (the figures for West Ger-
many are L.9Vo xd l.lVo tespec-
tively). A central determinant of
developments in East Germany is
western direct investment. In the
optimistic integration scenario
such investment remains at its
current high level until the year
2000, leading to a far-reaching re-
industrialisation process in the
new federal states. East Germany's
industrial output will then no
longer primarily serve local mar-
kets; a growing proportion will be
"exported" out of the region to West
Germany and abroad. In the s/og-
nation scenario, on the other hand,
direct investment declines after the
initial boom. In the more optimistic
scenario East German "exports" 
-
sales to West Germany and abroad
- 
expand to the year 2000 by an
annual rate of lO.6Vo, "imports" byjttst 1.77o per annum. In the s/qg'-
nation scenario exports rise by only
6.4Vaper annum. As a consequence,
on the more positive assumptions
East Germany's foreign trade defi-
cit narrows markedly by the year
2000, whereas under the less fa-
vourable conditions it contracts byjust l9Vo.
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For the labour market, both de-
mographic and labour market par-
ticipation trends are of central im-
portance. In the integration sce-
nario the population sinks fr om 1 5. 7
million in 1992 to 15.2 million in the
year 2000, a trend resulting exclu-
sively from natural demographic
developments. Although during the
observation period more people will
continue to migrate from East to
West Germany than in the reverse
direction, negative net intra-Ger-
man migration from the new federal
states (-300,000) will be more than
offset by immigration from abroad
(+400,000), primarily by ethnic Ger-
mans from eastern Europe. Under
such conditions, the number of for-
eigners as a proportion ofthe overall
East German population will rise
from l.\Vo in 1992 to 3 to 4Vo by t}re
year 2000. In the stagnation v aiant
migration from East to West Ger-
many is somewhat stronger, al-
though the same is true ofimmigra-
tion from abroad. The DIW authors
expect female participation rates to
decline 
- 
due to labourmarket pres-
sures 
- 
from their current high level
to the (slowly rising) West German
level by the year 201-0.
The most important exogenous
parameters and results of the DIW
prognosis are listed in Table 1. In
the optimistic scenario annual GDP
growth reaches lo.lVo 
- 
led by ex-
ports and investment; in the pessi-
mistic variant growth is just 5.87a.
In neither scenario will the West
German productivity level be even
approached by East German enter-
prises. And even in the optimistic
scenario industrial employment, at
just under 1.4 million, will amount
to just 91 industrial employees per
1000 inhabitants, i.e. below the
level recorded in the least indus-
trialised federal state in West Ger-
many(cf. EastGermanyno. 11, p.7).
Even so, manufacturing output will
expand at an annual rate of l8.0Vo
(1992-2000), and even in the more
pessimistic variant by l1.4Vo p.a.
In the integration scenario there
will be no increase in employment
between 1992 and the year 2000 
- 
a
reflection of the rapid rate of pro-
ductivity growth; in the less favour-
able scenario employment actually
falls further from 6 to 5.4 million.
The extent to which the labour mar-
ket is in disequilibrium then de-
pends decisively on changes in po-
tential labour supply. Under-em-
ployment 
- 
registered and non-reg-
istered unemplo5rment 
- 
will lie
somewhere between 1.6 and 2.2 mil-
lion, the unemployment rate be-
tween 13 and 197o. Only in the opti-
mistic variant is registered unem-
ployment 
- 
slightly 
- 
lower than at
present (approx. 157o). Even then
the unemployment rate would be
twice as high as in West Germany in
the year 2000. Thus in labour mar-
ket terms, even the "optimistic" sce-
nario is hardly comforting.
Prognos AG: An economic
miracle in East Ger:many
At the start of 1993 the Prognos AG
published a long-term prognosis for
Germany as a whole to the year
2010. It contains just one develop-
ment path, which the authors con-
sider probable, but is extraordinar-
ily optimistic. It is very much in line
with the DIW's integration scenario
to the year 2000, and indeed can be
seen as its extrapolation to 2010.
According to the prognosis East
German GDP will increase at an
annual rate of 9.2Vo between 1991
(the base year) and the year 2000,
and by 4.6?o p.a. during the follow-
ing decade. In this scenario, too, the
growthboom results from a particu-
larly high level of investment and a
rapid rise in exports. The "catching-
up" modernisation process centres
on swift reindustrialisation. Accord-
ing to Prognos, industrial output is
set to rise by L9.4Vo p.a. between
1992 and the year 2000 and.by 4.8Vo
between 2000 and 2010. Demandfor
East German industrial products is
expected to come primarily from
West Germany and abroad. East
German exports, whichby 1992 (DM
19 billion) had fallen by about halfon
their 1989 figure, are forecast to
explode to DM 172 billion, a figure
which excludes sales to West Ger-
many.This leads to the all but com-
plete closure of East Germany's
trade defrcit by the year 2010. In
spite of this blustering expansion,
which one is tempted to describe as
a second German economic miracle,
Iabour productivity in the new fed-
eral states is not expected to exceed
847o of the West German level by
2010. It should be borne in mind,
though, thatthis figure is consistent
with disparities between the West
German federal states.
The supposed economic miracle
does not leave much of a mark on the
East German labour market, how-
ever, as it is based primarily on
rapid productivity growth. Accord-
ing to the prognosis, emplo5rment
will fall to 5.7 million by the year
2000, and will subsequently expand
only marginally. The rate ofpopula-
tion decline is slightly steeper than
in the DIW scenario. Even so, un-
der-employment is expected to
reach almost 2 million by the year
2000, ofwhich only a proportion will
be reflectedinthe official unemploy-
ment figures. In the followingyears,
it is largely the rapid contraction of
the potential supply that leads to a
reduction in under-emplo5rment tojust over 1 million by 2010.
Both the integration scenario de-
veloped by the DIW and the Prognos
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Table 1 : Demographic and Economie Tlends in East Germany to
the Year 2000 (DIW)
1989 L994 2000
nlnt6gira- 
"Stagna-tion" tion"
Population (in millions)
GDP growth in 7o
Net exports
Fixed capital formation'
Private consumption'
Productiviff growthb in 7o
Potential labour force"
Total emplo5rment"
Industrial employees"'d
Under-employment"
Registered unemplo5rment"
Non-registered unemplo5ment'
Unemployment rutn (rn Vo)
15.2 15.010.1" 5.8"
-t27 -158155 16080 7410.7" 7.97,952 7,8806,075 5,4001,390 990L,637 2,L90935 1,370702 82012.9 19.4
16.4
n.a.
n.a.
48
n.a.
9,860
9,860
3,246
n.a.
5.9
-195
133
56
8.3
8,433
6,069
1,320
1,989
1,159
830
t5.2
n.a. = not available
a
b
c
d
e
per inhabitant; East-West ratio in 7o
GDP per employee
in thousands
manufacturing industry
annual growth rate 1992-2000
Source: German Institute for Economic Research (DM)
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Table 2: Key Data from the Prognos Scenario for East Gennany
to the Year 2010
201020001991 2005
Population (in millions)
Growth in 7ob
_ GDP
- 
Fixed capital formation
- 
Productivity
- 
Exports
- 
Imports
Net imports in DM billions
- 
of which: from West Germany
GDP per employee, East-West iatio in Vo
Potential labour force
Employment ln milliels
Under-employment in millions
15.9. 14.4 tB.7
9.2 6.1 3.19.4 2.9 3.0L2.0 5.8 2.6t3.2 6.8 3.82.3 0.2 3.0
180.9,
180,
29.0
8,929"
7,t79
2,562
89.5
75
67.1
7,725
5,730
1,995
20.9 r2.7t7 t480.8 83.9
n.a. 7,0205,833 5,983
n.a. I,062
n.a. 
= 
not available
a 1992b annual averages for the periods 1991-200, 2000-2005 and 2005-2010
Source: Prognos AG
forecast appear overoptimistic, as
they are based on long-term rei-
ndustrialisation with unrealisti-
cally high rates of growth of indus-
trial output and exports. Too little
attention is paid to the question of
where the demand for the supply-
side "economic miracle" is to come
from. Moreover, the feedback ef-
fects on the West German economy
of West German direct investment
in East Germany, as a key factor
behind expansion there, would ap-
pear to have been largely ignored: if,
indeed, direct investment is main-
tained at a high level over a long
period, this is likely to represent
primarily a regional shift from West
to East, the mirror image of which
will be lower investment levels in
the old Liinder.
Nl[H scenarios
Researchers at the IWH have pub-
lished a number of projections to
2005 and 2010. They differ in meth-
odological terms from the DfW and
Prognos studies. Neither the results
nor the assumptions are fully docu-
mented, and cannot therefore be
subjected to rigorous analysis.
Moreover, a large number of vari-
ants covering a broad spectrum of
possible developments have been
put forward, whereby the authors
have notmade clearwhichthey con-
siderthe mostprobable. Atthe same
time, the projections reveal a
number of determining factors be-
hind economic developments which
do not appear with such clarity in
the prognoses discussed so far.
The study by H. Schneider et al.
from the IWH begins by analysing
the current situation, and comes to
the astonishing conclusion that the
total number of working hours per
year per person of working age (i.e.
between 15 and 65) was scarcely
lower in East Germany (in 1993)
than in West Germany. The under-
emplo5rment rate (the unemployed
and those in labour market policy
measures as a percentage of the
employed and the under-employed),
on the other hand, was 30Vo in the
new federal states, compared withjust 9Va in the old Liinder (cf. p. 2,
row 11.1 in this volume). Ttris sug-
gests that the difference in the ex-
tent of under-emplo5rment between
East and West Gerrnany is due to
differences not in total working
hours, butin participation rates and
individual working time: according
to fWH, almost two thirds of the
under-emplo5rment in East Ger-
many is explained by the higher
labour force participation, particu-
larly that oflvomen. Ifparticipation
rates had been as inWest Germany,
E ast German under-emplo5rment in
1993 would have been just 1.1mil-
lion rather than the actual figure of
2.7 million. On top of this come the
longer working hours in East Ger-
many and the smaller relative
number of part-time jobs. If average
working hours per employee in the
new Liinder had been the s4me as in
West Germany (in 1993), the
number of under-employed here
would-in purely statistical terms 
-
have been 8%olower.
Clearly one possible 
- 
although
arbitrary 
- 
way of interpreting
these findings is to claim that East
German under-emplo5rment is in
fact relatively "harmless", and that
female participation rates and the
extent of part-time emplo5mrent
should be brought into line with
West German levels as quickly as
possible. In their long-term progno-
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sis, however, the fWH authors as-
srrme that the East Germanpropen-
sity to work is likely to move into
line with that in West Germany only
gradually, and will not have ad-justed firlly by the year 2010. The
greater part of the adjustment will
have occurred, according to the
prognosis, by the year 2000 (reduc-
tion in potential labour supply by
around 1 million persons).
Given the gradual adjustment on
the labour supply side 
- 
considered
the most probable path 
- 
the fore-
casts for labour demand in East
Germany to the year 2010 imply,
depending on the assumptions
made, under-emplo5nnent of be-
tween 875,000 and 3.3 million. The
firstfigure would result from a com-
plete adjustment of East German
demand and production structures
to those in the west of the country
(same domestic and foreign demand
per capita, same productivity level).
The massive job shortfall of over 3
million, on the other hand, would
result if the demand and supply
structures prevailing in 1993 were
maintained. The projections show
clearly that East Germany's eco-
nomis development depends prima-
rily on the extent to which the West
German level of domestic per capita
demand and West German export
shares can be attained. Clearly,
such a change presupposes re-
industrialisation. As already men-
tioned, as far as the labour market is
concerned, demographic trends and
participation rates are also ofdeci-
sive importance.
Another prognosis conducted by
the IWH (IWH Herbstgutachten
lAutumn ReportJ 1993, p. 69 tr )
puts forward three scenarios to the
year 2005, all based on an assumed
decline in the overall population to
14.3 million and a potential labour
supply of 7.9 million in that year.
The first scenario 
- 
"status quo" 
-
extrapolates the developments
which occurred up to 1994 to the
year 2005, whereby investment ac-
tivity is assumed to have firlly ad-justed to West German figures by
the final year ofthe prognosis. This
generates growthof 7.4Vo p.a. to the
year 2000, declining to an annual
rate of 3.4Vo for the five following
years. During the period under con-
sideration the level of emplo5rment
falls by around 450,000; in 2005
under-employment is at around 1.7
million. In the second 
- 
"working
9
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time" 
- 
scenario, working hours are
reduced considerably-to around 32
hours per week in the non-farm sec-
tor 
- 
while the other assumPtions
remain unchanged. As a result, the
Ievel of employment in 2005 re-
mains at about the level recorded in
1993; around 1.3 million Persons
are under-employed. In the third 
-
"employment" 
- 
scenario, finallY,
the East German economy moves
over to a higher investment trajec-
tory, generating annual economic
growth of 8.3Vototheyear2000, and
subsequently of 4.2Vo. Working
hours again contract markedlY.
This leads to under-employment ofjust 1.15 million in 2005. Although
the three scenarios have not Yet
been fully developed in methodo-
Iogical terms, they do clearly show
the role that could be plaYed bY
changes in working hours.
Population: From 16 to 12.9
rnillion?
Recently demographic experts from
the Humboldt UniversitY in Berlin
published population forecasts for
the new Liinder which can be of
considerable assistance in estimat-
ing potential labour supply trends(Mtinz/Lllrich 1994). The authors
base their calculations on the expe-
riences ofthe years 1989 to 1993: 1.3
million East Germans migrated to
West Germany (migxation in the
opposite direction amounted to
around 300,000); the number of
marriages fell and birth rates de-
clined by 657o, divorce rates by 807o.
A number of scenarios have been
developed to the year 2010, ofwhich
one is considered the most Plausi
ble. Inthisversion, East Germany's
population losses due to net out-
ward migration (to and from West
Germany and the rest of the world)
settle at around 0.37o Per arlnum;
this currently amounts to around
45,000 individuals. From 1996 on,
annual net migration remains con-
stant. The high level of outward
migration throughout the prognosis
period is largely put down to the
unfavourable emplo5rment situa-
tion; an additional factor is that eth-
nic German immigrants and asY-
lum seekers are unlikely to settle in
East Germany in large numbers.
Ferbility figures gradually adjust to
West German levels; around two
thirds ofthe "postponed" births are
subsequently offset by women giv-
ing birth later in life.
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On these assumptions, bY the
year 2010 East Germany's resident
population will have declined by al-
most 2OVo as against 1990 (bY
l6.4Vo against 1993) ti 12.9 million
(2000: 14.1 million). Over the Pe-
riod 1990 to 2010 4070 ofthe raPid
decline in the population is due to
net outward migration and 6OVo to
the lower level of births than
deaths. This trend leads to funda-
mental changes in age structures.
Between 1990 and 2010 the
number of East German residents
aged less than 20 falls by 587o,
while the population ofgreatest rel-
evance to the labour market (the 20
to 60 year-olds) contracts bY LBVo;
the number of elderly persons (over
60), by contrast, expands by L4Vo.
These trends will therefore serve to
ease the pressure on the labour
market 
- 
somewhat but not deci-
sively. The real pressure-easing
impact will not occur until after
2010 as an "echo effect'of the mas-
sive fall in the birth rate after 1989.
It should be noted, however, that
the 
- 
in general very bleak 
- 
progno-
sis stands and falls on the assump-
tions on migration, which are diffi-
cult to forecast over such a long
period and which, moreover, are
susceptible to the inlluence ofsuit-
able policies.
Regional adiustment processes:
Experiences from other
countries
Although the transformation in
eastern Germany is a unique his-
torical process, differing both from
the upheavals in East EuroPean
countries and from regional struc-
tural crises in developed market
economies, it is valuable to look
back on the experience ofregional
adjustment processes in western
market economies in order better to
be able to evaluate the development
chances of the new Liinder. The
long-term development of regional
disparities in western countries
can, by serving as a reference model,
possibly provide some indication of
just how plausible the various long-
term prognoses for East GermanY
are.
For the USA, in 1991 Barro/Sala-
i-Martin published a thorough
study of regional develoPments
from 1880 to 1987. Their conclusion
was that there is a clear trend to-
wards a convergence ofregional per-
capita incomes in the USA. The in-
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come disparities between the Poor
and the rich states contracted sig-
nificantly, although only as a trend
and extremely slowly, namely over
several decades: on average the gaP
narrowed by just 2Vo Pet annum.
Even so, the empirical evidence is
very clear that in the longer term
per capitaincomes in the poor states
have grown more rapidly than in the
richer states. Supplementing the
above analysis, the authors also
analysed developments in 73 West
European regions in seven coun-
tries (Germany, Great Britain,
Italy, France, the Netherlands, BeI-
gium and Denmark) overthe period
1950 to 1985: the findings confirm
the development trends identified
in the USA. On the basis of these
trends, the authors conclude, the
a{ustment process between the
two halves of Germany would take
35 years to overcome just half of the
initial disparity.
In a more recent studY,
Blanchard,/Katz go one step further
and analyse how regions in the USA
have responded to regional shocks
and crises since the end ofthe Sec-
ond WorldWar. Initially unemploy-
ment rises sharply, particiPation
rates fall temporarily and, above all,
outward migration occurs. After
about seven years unemPloYment
and participation rates return to
normal and employment expands
somewhat, although without com-
ing even near its original level. TWo
thirds of the impact ofthe crisis are
absorbed by labour migration. In
the longer-term, the authors con-
clude, regional growth and employ-
ment trends are very stable over
decades; the weaker states ofNew
England, the west coast, the coal
regions and the "rust belt" find
themselves on a "below-average
path"; above-average trends are re-
corded in the "sun-belt" states, the
"oil states" and parts of the mid-
west. Given that mobility in Europe(and Germany) is significantly
lower than in the USA, it seems
plausible to assume that here re-
gional crises can be "solved" by mi-
gration to a significantly lesser ex-
tent than in the USA..
In the light of such regional
analyses, many economists take a
very sceptical view of intra-Ger-
man developments. Hughes HulIeU
Ma estimate that firll convergence
will take not less than 30 to 40
years. Dornbusch./Wolf take a simi-
lar view: they see the main prob-
lems as the time required to over-
come the East-West productivity
gap, which at the start of the Unifi-
cation process emounted to around
7 07o. DornbtschAMolf point to vari-
ous growth countries and phases
since 1945: Japan, for instance, set
up an international record in the
1960s, managing to make up 20
percentage points of the then pre-
vailing productivity gap vis d vis
the USA during that decade. Hong
Kong achieved similarly fast pro-
ductivity growth at times. Clearly,
though, such comparisons overlook
the specific situation in Germany,
where a large proportion ofthe ex-
isting enterprises was closed down;
the newly founded firms and those
existing firms acquired during pri-
vatisation have attained the high-
est productivity levels within a
very short space of time. The prob-
lem with this process is that it in-
volved the loss ofa large proportion
of the existing employment oppor-
tunities. Thus a distinction should
be drawn between the rapid pro-
ductivity growth in terms of output
per emplqree anLd, the far slower
growth of uregional productivit/
(i.e. output p er inhabitant).
If nothing else, the comparison
with regional developments in de-
veloped western market economies
shows that it is unrealistic to count
on an "optimistic" trend, leading to
rapid full convergence with West
Germany. While one must clearly
beware of simply transposing expe-
riences from the USA or westera
Europe onto East Germany, there
is much to support the view that
even with the help of government
intervention and massive financial
transfers, it will not prove possible
to achieve full convergence of pro-
ductivity levels in East and West
German firms by the year 2010. If,
by way 6f sxample, the growth rate
expected for East Germany for
1995 of around 8.57o (compared
vuith 2.57o in the old, Liind.er) were
maintained, and assuming un-
changed populations in the two re-
gions, convergence of per capita
GDP would take 16 years. Yet this
trend, like the Prognos forecast,
seems rather unlikely. On the
other hand, it does seem probable
that the prevailing labour market
problems will to a large extent be
"solved" by outward migration,
early retirement, and falling birth
and female participation rates.
This will enable East and West
German unemployment rates 
- 
as
measured by the official figures 
- 
to
converge more quickly than the re-
gional Per-caPita t'"o-?;, 
Priewe
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Amendments to the Labour Promotion Act
T\cyo far-reaching errrsldrnsllts to the Labour Promotion Act carne
into force on I .Ianuar5r and 1 August 1994. Iheir mqin aim is to limit
spending on labour market policy 
- 
and thus the size of the central
government grant to the Federal Labour Office 
- 
as a contribution
to controllingthe rapid rise inpublic debt.Atthe same tirne, a range
of new provisions 
- 
such as the admission of private job placement
agencies, support for part-time emplo5rment and self-emplo5rment 
-
is intended to raise labour market flexibility.
The "First Iaw implementing the West) Germany (cf. inforMISEP no.
saving, consolidation and $owth 45, pp. 7-8):
programme", which came into force 
- 
The wage-replacement rate of un-
on 1 Januaql 1994, has amended emploSrment benefit, short-time
the Labour Promotion Act (LPA) on working allowance, bad-weather
the following points relevant to la- allowance and unemplo5rment as-
bour market policy in East (and sistance is reduced by three per-
centage points; for benefit recipi-
ents with a child the reduction isjust one percentage point. Unem-
ployment benefit now amounts to
60c/o of previous net monthly
wages for the unemployed with-
out children and,677o for those
with children.
The maintenance allowance paid
to participants in further voca-
tional training measures is re-
duced to the current level ofunem-
ployment benefit. This does away
with the direct financial incentive
to participate in further voca-
tional training. The legal entitle-
ment to the maintenance allow-
ance was abolished as was sup-
port for advanced training to gain
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promotion (Aufstieesfortbildung
- 
cf. East Germany no.6, p. 5).
- 
Unemployed persons entitled to
unemployment assistance be-
cause they had not worked long
enough for entitlement for unem-
ployment benefit can now only
receive unemployment assist-
ance for a maximum of one year.(Entitlement to unemployment
assistance arising when entitle-
ment to unemployment benefit
expires, on the other hand, re-
mains unlimited.)
- 
The bad-weather allowance, paid
in construction firms suffering
loss ofwork due to badweather, is
restricted to three months (from
December to Eebruary) and will
be abolished completely in 1996.
- 
In future the ernployer hust pay
the social insurance contribrltions
of short-time workers for the lost
working hours ; previously, part of
bhis sum was reimbursed by the
Federal Labour Office (cf. East
Gemany no. 1, p. 6).
- 
The special programme to inte-
grate the particularly difficult-to-
place unemployed, which has
largely been used to promote the
recruitment of trainers and other
staff for labour market policy
projects, has been included in the
Labour Promotion Act (until the
end of1998). Since 1989 this pro-
gramme has been financed from
the central government budget,
and not, unlike the rest oflabour
market policy, from contributions
to the Federal Labour Office; sub-
sequently, central government
and the Federal Labour Office are
to share the costs.
The Employment Promotion Act
1994, which came into force on
1 August 1994, has brought about
the following significant changes to
the Labour Promotion Act as far as
East Germany is concerned (cf.
inforMISEP no.4'1, pp. 4-6):
- 
Wage cost subsidies under $ 249h
of the LPA (cf. East Germany no.
10, p. 8) are now also available to
work in mass-participation sport,
the cultural sphere and in prepa-
ration for measures to restore
historical monuments.
- 
The stipulation under $ 249h of
the LPA that wage costs will only
be subsidised ifthey are at least
107o below pay rates for compara-
ble activities outside thejob-crea-
tion schemes now also applies tojob-creation measures (ABM).
The previous restriction of this
provision to job-creation sihemes
enjoyrng especially high levels of
support and the possibility of
concluding part-time contracts of
no more thxrSD%o of usual work-
ing hours in place ofthe reduced
pay levels (cf. East Gernany no.
6, p. 8) have been abolished.
- 
The unemployed are nov/ permit-
ted (subject to the agreement of
the employment office) to partici-
pate in a short-term further
training scheme (lasting up to 12
weeks) without loss of entitle-
ment to unemploymentbenefit or
assistance. (Previously participa-
tion in vocational further train-
ing led to the suspension of un-
employment compensation enti-
tlement, as it was then assumed
that the unemployed person was
not available for work.)
- 
Recipients of unemplo5rment as-
sistance are now able (on a volun-
tary basis and subject to the
agreement of the employment of-
fice) to undertake community
work without loss of benefit enti-
tlement; this is subject to the con-
dition that remuneration for
such work does not exceed a
small allowance to cover ex-
penses.
- 
Unemployed persons entering
self-employment are now enti-
tled to the so-called "bridging aI-
lowance" (ilberbribkungsgeld. 
-
de facto a continued entitlement
to unemplo5ment benefit) for a
standard period of26 weeks (pre-
viously the benefit was usually
only available for 10 weeks).
- 
Employees moving from full-time
employment to a part-time job
(with less than 807o of standard
working hours) and who subse-
quently become unemployed 
-
within the following three years
- 
will be treated, as far as calcu-
lating their unemplo5ment ben-
efit is concerned, as if they had
remained in fuIl-time employ-
ment. Their unemployment ben-
efitwill be calculated on the basis
of their ear:nings in their previ-
ous fulI-time position, although
the benefit may not exceed the
net wages earned during the pe-
riod of part-time employment.
- 
In addition to job placement by
the employment offices, private
job placement agencies have also
been permitted to operate. The
Federal Labour Office is obliged
to grant a licence to private agen-
cies that meet the requirements
of being suitable, reliable, finan-
cially sound and with appropri-
ate premises. Job placement
agencies may as a matter of prin-
ciple only charge employers for
their services.
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